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The Endurance of Biological Connection:
Heteronormativity, Same-Sex Parenting and the Lessons
of Adoption
Annette R. Appell
I. INTRODUCTION
United States family law is largely based on the modern family in
that the foundation of family law is the patriarchal, heterosexual nuclear
family, and biology and marriage define family relationships and
regulate rights, privileges, and benefits among family members and
against the state. However, the lived relations that constitute postmodern
families are much more expansive, increasingly fluid, and include adultadult and adult-child relationships that do not have the sanction of
marriage or biological connection. Lesbian and gay families are prime,
but not the only, examples of these postmodern families.1 As a reflection
of this disconnect between law and society, family law has entered a
postmodern phase in which society is seeking to accommodate these
complex and unstable family constellations both by changing law to
govern family formation and dissolution and by protecting extralegal
relationships that are formed intentionally and consensually. 2 Thus,
postmodern family law is changing to reflect social, and not merely
biological and marital, relationships. These postmodern families are
pushing us away from biological connectivity, a movement which is not
entirely unproblematic,3 but provides significant benefits.


Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs, Washington University Law School. A big
thank you to my colleague Joan Howarth for helpful comments on an earlier draft, to my research
assistants Kim Horner and Kristina Escamilla, and to Lynn Wardle and the Brigham Young
University Law School for sponsoring and organizing this provocative symposium.
1. Postmodern families include a variety of family formations that are not nuclear and
patriarchal; in other words, they include families headed by single or divorced parents, families with
working mothers, and stepparent families. See JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY 6–7
(1996) (noting the wide array of families that are not headed by a wife who stays home to rear the
children and a husband who works outside the home to support the family).
2. These changes include de facto parent protections and domestic partnership and civil
union laws that provide some quasi-marital benefits to unmarried partners. See Annette R. Appell,
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 720–37 (2001).
3. See discussion infra at Sec. II.B–C, III (describing the failed attempt to disregard
biological connection and assessing the complications of accommodating biology in families in
which the child has only one biologically related parent).
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This article considers the role of absent biological parents in lesbian
and gay families and the lessons adoption law and practice provide for
these families. Instead of taking a position on the method or propriety of
these changing family formations, this article explores how children in
lesbian and gay families might experience their absent birth relations and
how these families can, and often do, respond to their children‘s longing
for their biological kin. This exploration reflects conventional adoption
norms which, like many lesbian and gay families, both mimic and
disregard biological family formation and embrace unitary or binary
exclusive parenting while pretending the absent biological parent does
not exist. These norms, however, have not fully withstood the test of
time.
The American experience with adoption law, which was
institutionalized during the rise of the modern family, illustrates that
biology cannot be ignored. Adopted children and adults, as well as
people born through donor-insemination, have challenged this disconnect
and have pushed adoption practice and law to better accommodate the
tensions between parental autonomy and the persistent push and pull of
biological connection. 4 These tensions and accommodations contain a
number of lessons for families that are not fully biologically defined or
contained, such as families headed by single or coupled lesbians and gay
men. The most important lessons adoption can share are the failures
attendant to the pretense of rebirth and anonymity and the apparent
successes of blending birth and adoptive kin to create new family
systems. The legal regulation of post adoption contact among family
members, also known as ―cooperative adoption‖ or ―adoption with
contact,‖ provides another set of lessons.
This article traces the intersecting and diverging paths of the legal
norms regarding adoption and legal recognition of same sex parents. It
compares how adoption law, which for much of its relatively short life
tried to replicate the modern family by ignoring biology, is now
embracing biology and how lesbian and gay family law is replicating the
postmodern family form while moving away from its biological roots.
Lesbian and gay families, many of them adoptive, appear, however, to be
heeding lessons about the endurance of biology and acknowledging and
even embracing their children‘s biological families. Section II reveals the
tenacity of biological connection and its deep and wide significance in
United States culture, history, and law. To illustrate this tenacity, the
section rehearses the failed attempt to close adoption and the resulting

4. Birth and adoptive parents too have been part of these movements. See infra text
accompanying notes 34–42.
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corrective actions. Section III explores lesbian and gay families with
children, noting ways these families reflect heteronormativity through
two, rather than plural, parent families and yet still value and honor
biological connections by including reproductive partners, such as sperm
donors and surrogates, into their family systems. These largely
unregulated family systems suggest that same-sex parents are cognizant
of the important role of biological connections and of the benefits that
can come from enlarging the circle of adults connected to the child. The
article concludes, in Section IV, with lessons open-adoption law and
practice might offer lesbian and gay families with children, particularly
regarding the possible benefits of developing legal schemes regarding
these family systems.
II. BIOLOGICAL PRIVILEGE AND VALUE
This article is part of a larger project that aims to anchor postmodern
family law in the physical, social, and economic conditions that affect
the most disaffected among us: those who are socially, economically, and
politically disadvantaged and those who have experienced the legal loss
of a biological parent or child. In this context, biological privilege is not
necessarily a symbol and tool of oppressive patriarchal power and
traditional family values, but instead offers the only wealth and power to
which people have relatively equal access regardless of their gender,
class, or race.5 The biological connection and the value family law still
places on those connections benefit the most vulnerable families. 6
Moreover, biology remains important for a host of affective,
psychological, and existential reasons.
A. The Existential Value of Biological Ties
The social and legal privilege of biology serves deep and wide
political and moral purposes, as critical parental rights proponents have
explored elsewhere,7 and also meets social and psychological needs. This
is not to say that biology and biological connections are not constructed
or are inherently important, somehow true, or otherwise absolute. It is to
5. Appell, supra note 2.
6. This is because parental status is based primarily on biological connections, including the
relationship to a biological parent (e.g., through marriage), and such status cannot be revoked except
on the grounds of parental neglect or abuse. Parental rights belong to parents regardless of race,
socioeconomic status, age, sexual orientation or identity. Id. at 758–79.
7. See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY
VALUES (1997); Appell, supra note 2; Dorothy Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 171 (2003).
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say that in our cultural, medical, and legal context, biological ties and
genetic make-up—for better and for worse—matter. Genes, genetic
background, and family history increasingly inform medical science.8 In
addition, people are fascinated by their genetic background and what it
reveals about where they came from and who their ancestors were.9 Even
the construction of race is based on a set of social norms or
understandings relating to blood lines, national heritage, and often skin
pigment. 10 For these and perhaps other reasons, biological connection
and family history are extraordinarily important to the formation of
identity. Accordingly, the disruption of these connections is not without
consequence.11
Identity is a complex, oppositional, non-linear construct that operates
on psychological, political, personal, and social levels and takes shape by
contemplating difference and sameness. 12 For example, as a
psychological matter, identity is part of human cognitive and emotional
development through which a person begins to understand him- or
herself as separate from but related to others: as a person who has a past,
present, and future—a person with race, ethnicity, sex, gender, likes,
dislikes, and personal experiences, and other aspects of one‘s sense of
self.13 As a social matter, identity relates to one‘s membership in a social
group, such as doctor, lawyer, woman, white. 14 Similarly, political
identity includes claims arising out of membership in a group, and claims
for benefits arising out of difference and belonging.15 The navigation of
8. James Lindemann Nelson, Genetic Narratives: Biology, Stories, and the Definition of the
Family, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 71 (1992).
9. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 219–20 (1995) [hereinafter
Roberts, The Genetic Tie]. But see id. at 231–38 (highlighting the relative lack of interest African
Americans have in genetic ties when compared to cultural and political identity). Of course, race is
not biological, but socially constructed. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Legal Constraints on the Use of
Race in Biomedical Research: Toward a Social Justice Framework, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 526,
526 (2006) (―Social scientists‘ conclusion that race is socially constructed was confirmed by
genomic studies of human variation, including the Human Genome Project, showing high levels of
genetic similarity within the human species.‖).
10. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 9, at 223–30.
11. As explored infra Sec. II.C, these consequences relate to the adoptee‘s identity formation,
the pervasive cultural value of biological connection, and the futility of seeking to erase or ignore
these connections.
12. See Barry Richards, What is Identity?, in IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD,
CULTURE, IDENTITY AND TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 77 (Ivor Gaber & Jane Aldridge, eds., 1994).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 81–84; see also Eric J. Mitnick, Law, Cognition, and Identity, 67 LA. L. REV. 823,
845–47, 857–69 (2007) (discussing social and personal identity in similar terms as Richards, though
more extensively, and characterizing personal identity also with individual traits, such as being
charming).
15. E.g., civil rights arising out of the Reconstruction Amendments and Civil Rights Acts;
see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20,
1989) (protecting identity); see also Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 9, at 232–33 (noting the
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these various aspects of external projections and belonging and of
personal experiences, relationships, and constitution give us a sense of
identity—how we are like and unlike others, what makes us distinct, and
what makes us belong.
Law and culture construct biology and biological connections as
meaningful and hence meaningful for purposes of identity. In this
country, racial categories have been defined socially and legally around
country of origin, 16 the status or ―race‖ of parents, 17 and skin color. 18
These categories and control of their parameters and content are sites of
political, legal, and social struggles.19 Not surprisingly, persons with the
most privilege control these sites and determine the value of family
connections and the flow of children, which normally runs from the
disadvantaged to the advantaged. 20 This separation reflects a sort of
market perspective, an idea that certain human beings are untethered,
moveable, and blank enough to be remade into another image. But from
the perspective of these transferable human beings, biological ties, race,
culture, and history are an important part of their identity.21

political content of Black identity).
16. LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 76–77, 105 (1999);
Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 9, at 223–30.
17. E.g., children born to enslaved women were the property of the slave-owner. PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 18 (1991); Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 9,
at 226, 250. Children born into a family with a Black ancestor were considered Black regardless of
the race of other ancestors. Id. at 228–30. Children born to a Native American parent are likely to be
considered Native American. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2000); Annette R.
Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141, 162 (2004)
(discussing Indian family exception doctrine); see also Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines:
Children and Bans on Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 4 (2008)
(rehearsing the connection among anti-miscegenation laws, white supremacy and discouraging white
women from bearing biracial children).
18. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 9, at 225–38.
19. Annette R. Appell, “Bad” Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 NEV. L. J. 759,
759–65 (2007).
20. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 16 (rehearsing the child savers‘ treatment of children of
immigrants and the use of orphan trains generally, and more specifically, the prohibition of Mexican
American families from adopting European ―orphans‖); Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers,
Deployable Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 421, 440–64 (2004) (discussing connections between
welfare and children welfare reform and the one-way transfer transracial adoption from poor African
American families to white families); Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy Roberts, A Feminist Social
Justice approach to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal
Theory, 84 KY. L.J. 1197, 1217–18 (1996) (noting tendency of courts to uphold powerful, rich men‘s
rights over birth mothers in surrogacy contracts and how poor people‘s reproductive freedom is often
compromised); Judith Stacey, Gay Parenthood and the Decline of Paternity as We Knew It, 9
SEXUALITIES 27, 39 (2006) (―Independent adoption agencies enable middle-class gay men, again
primarily but not exclusively white and coupled, to adopt healthy infants of a variety of hues.‖); see
also Callahan & Roberts, supra, at 1199 (noting that non-Hispanic white women are by far the
primary consumers of reproductive technology).
21. See, e.g., SANDRA PATTON, BIRTHMARKS: TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA 2 (2000) (observing that ―transracial adoptees . . . struggled with questions of history,
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Those whose own or whose ancestors‘ biological connections have
not been valued and who have been separated from their genetic,
cultural, political, or historic past experience a longing for and interest in
those connections. For example, African Americans whose ancestors
were forcibly torn from their families, tribes, villages, communities, and
cultures and brought to the Americas experienced profound disruptions
of identity.22 Their family names, language, childrearing, food, and other
customs were breached both through sales that tore children from kin and
through brutal imposition of a new way of life.23 These breaches, the lack
of names, and the simple lack of family history so many generations ago
have driven African Americans today to uncover these mysteries and
find the missing pieces of their identities—whence they came, to what
group they belong, and what journey preceded the past few generations.24
Native Americans too experienced forced disruptions in their history
and cultural life in many ways, including the several-century-long policy
of removing Native American children from their homes and tribes to
boarding schools and Anglo-American families.25 These disruptions led
to personal, cultural, and political loss. Separated Native American
children experienced emotional trauma and feelings of disconnection and
alienation. 26 Tribal cultures suffered, as there was a dearth of young
origin, and the meaning of adoption as they continually engaged in processes of identity construction
and maintenance‖); OUTSIDERS WITHIN: WRITING ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (Jane Jeong Trenka,
Julia Chinyere Oparah & Sun Yung Shin eds., 2006) (collection of reflections of transracial and
international adoptees regarding their navigation of their birth and adoptive cultures, particularly
growing up in white, middle class, American families and neighborhoods).
22. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 90–91; E. Christi Cunningham, Exit Strategy For The Race
Paradigm, 50 HOW. L.J. 755, 764 (2007). This is not to suggest that African-Americans did not
create new and diverse cultures and traditions in the Americas. See, e.g., IRA BERLIN, MANY
THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 17–28 (1998)
(describing rich and complex social relations, practices, hierarchies and communities).
23. For discussions of African and African-American children in and after slavery, see, e.g.,
HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925 (1976); WILMA
KING, STOLEN CHILDHOOD: SLAVE YOUTH IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1995); STEVEN
MINTZ, HUCK‘S RAFT: A STORY OF AMERICAN CHILDHOOD (2004); MARIE JENKINS SCHWARTZ,
BORN IN BONDAGE: GROWING UP ENSLAVED IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (2000).
24. For example, the African American DNA and history project of leading African and
African American studies expert Henry Louis Gates examines the historical records of the slave
trade and later census, voting and other records of the ancestors of present day African Americans,
and uses DNA testing to trace individual DNA back to various regions in Africa and Europe.
AFRICAN AMERICAN LIVES 2 (Kunhardt Productions, Inkwell Films & Thirteen WNET New York
2008), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/aalives/ (last visited June 11, 2007).
25. Appell, supra note 17, at 148–50; H.R. REP. NO. 104–808, at 16 (1974). At least fifty
thousand Indian children were adopted by non-Indians in the twentieth century. MINTZ, supra note
23, at 172 n.45.
26. William Byler, The Destruction of American Indian Families, in THE DESTRUCTION OF
AMERICAN INDIAN FAMILIES 1, 7–9 (Steven Unger ed., 1977); Sandra C. Ruffin, Postmodernism,
Spirit Healing, and the Proposed Amendments to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 30 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 1221, 1222 (1999).
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people to carry on tradition.27 The result was a political crisis in which
tribes themselves were losing members. 28 Here, the diminution of
biological connection, the vehicle for culture, was felt deeply and widely
among children and their elders, while well-meaning missionaries
thought those ties could be ignored when they placed children in settings
where they would learn the dominant norms of the colonists.29 Individual
children, families, and entire tribes struggled with identity after these
interventions.30
Though less violent, less inherently hegemonic, and not entirely
concentrated in non-dominant racial or cultural groups,31 adoption itself
is similar to these group-based fissures because adoption frequently
involves poor children, often of color, who are transferred to families
with more power and resources, and because adoption represents a
complete break from the adoptee‘s past or a part of her past. The
phenomenon of closed, anonymous adoption overlooked—or perhaps
underestimated—the depth, breadth, and complexity of identity. Even
viewed from the narrow psychological perspective of the adoption
professionals, the pretense that a child has no life before adoption is built
on an unwitting commodification of the adopted child—the view of a
human being without ties, without a past, without race, an object that
simply and seamlessly can be taken from one place and put in another.32
In a culture in which biological relations provide the first principle of the
parent-child relationship and exceptions to that principle provide for
alternate parent-child relationships, it is still unimaginable that a child‘s
birth connections would not be experienced by all members of the triad
even when those birth connections are legally void.
It is not surprising then that social scientists, birth parents, adoptive
parents, and adoptees have discovered that knowledge regarding these
connections plays an important role in the development of adoptees‘
identities.33 It is common for adoptees to experience a deep and ongoing
27. Appell, supra note 17, at 145–48.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 147–48.
30. Id.
31. This is not to say that substitute care and adoption were not used to undermine or destroy
culture. Beside using these tools to ―civilize‖ Native American Children, the child saving, and later
the Progressive movements removed children from poor Catholic European immigrants (usually
mothers) to teach them protestant values and ways of living. Appell, supra, note 20.
32. See Barbara Yngvesson, Placing the “Gift Child” in Transnational Adoption, 36 LAW &
SOC‘Y REV. 227, 239 (2002) (explaining that it is the adoptive child‘s preexisting ties to a family, a
history, a culture, not just their potential for the future that distinguishes prospective adoptees from
mere commodities).
33. DAVID BRODZINSKY ET AL., BEING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF (1992);
MIRIAM REITZ & KENNETH W. WATSON, ADOPTION AND THE FAMILY SYSTEM (1992); ARTHUR D.
SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED RECORD ON ADOPTEES,
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desire for ―roots, for existential continuity, and for a sense of
completeness.‖34 This ―genealogical bewilderment‖35 is common among
adoptees, regardless of the quality of their adoptive family relationships,
and do not detract from those relationships. This sense of connection and
wonder are simply part of the adoption experience. 36 This interest in
connections is not limited to adoptees; birth parents and adoptive parents
experience them as well. Birth parents often feel deep and ongoing or
episodic connection to the children they relinquished.37 Adoptive parents
too experience the gap between their child‘s original family or
community and the child‘s adopted one and have their own curiosities
about the child‘s birth family. 38 Although adoptees are most likely to
return to seek information about their birth kin, many adoptive parents
also seek to bridge these information and experiential gaps through
contact with the adoptive agency 39 and contact with the child‘s home
community or country. 40 Birth parents as well commonly seek
information and connection about the children they relinquished or
otherwise lost legal connection to.41
Indeed, the entire adoption triad—the adoptive parents, child, and
birth parents—experience each other in fact or in imagination and are
changed by each other. For example, transracial adoptees both retain and
lose their race upon adoption in complicated and contingent ways,
depending on where and with whom they are.42 It is not uncommon for
parents who adopt internationally to try to experience the country
whence their child came and to introduce the child to his or her home
language or culture. 43 Birth parents seek pictures and even ongoing
BIRTH PARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS (1978); Fernando Colon, Family Ties and Child
Placement, 17 FAM. PROCESS 289, 302 (1978); H.J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children
with Substitute Parents, 37 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 133 (1964).
34. Colon, supra note 33, at 302.
35. Sants, supra note 33.
36. BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 12–14; REITZ & WATSON, supra note 33.
37. SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 220.
38. Mardell Groth et al., An Agency Moves Toward Open Adoption of Infants, 66 CHILD
WELFARE 247 (1987).
39. E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF
ADOPTION 75–77 (1998); Groth et al., supra note 38.
40. Barbara Yngvesson, Going “Home” Adoption, Loss of Bearings, and the Mythology of
Roots, 21 SOC. TEXT 74 (2003).
41. CARP, supra note 39, at 76–79.
42. African Americans adopted into white families report being perceived as Black when in
white communities and white while in Black communities. RUTH G. MCROY & LOUIS A. ZURCHER,
JR., TRANSRACIAL AND INRACIAL ADOPTEES: THE ADOLESCENT YEARS 13–14 (1983); PATTON,
supra note 21, at 13–14; Yngvesson, supra note 32, at 238–40, 248–52 (noting that a transracially,
internationally adopted Korean adoptee may be Korean when with his or her Swedish parents but
Swedish when among Koreans).
43. See Yngvesson, supra note 40, at 14–23 (describing such practices among Swedish
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relationships with the adoptive parents or child after adoption. 44
Increasingly, birth and adoptive families form extended kin networks in
which they might vacation together, 45 attend each other‘s family
functions, 46 and babysit for each other. 47 The experience of adoption,
however, was not always so open and dynamic.
B. Adoption’s (Failed) Attempt to Escape Biological Ties
Adoption was, arguably, the first legal diversion from the patriarchal
family and primogeniture in recent history. Adoption did not exist in
England until 1926. 48 Thus, it was not part of the lexicon the United
States carried over from England and was unknown at common law. The
first general adoption statutes in the Unites States, enacted in the 1850s,
established the hallmark of adoption: the termination of one family and
creation of another, when in the interests of the child.49 Before enactment
of these general adoption statutes, persons who wanted to create a legal
relationship with a child did so through private legislative acts. 50 The
general adoption statutes permitted adopters to petition the courts rather
than the legislature to establish a parent-child relationship. 51 This
adoptors of Chilean children).
44. See Annette R. Appell, Blending Families through Adoption: Implications for
Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1018–19 (1995) (describing birth
parent ongoing interest in relinquished children).
45. Deborah H. Siegel, Open Adoption of Infants: Adoptive Parents’ Feelings Seven Years
Later, 48 SOC. WORK 409, 414 (2003).
46. For example, the adoptive family may attend the birth mother‘s wedding. Id. at 415;
Murray Ryburn, A Study of Post-Adoption Contact in Compulsory Adoptions, 26 BRIT. J. OF SOC.
WORK 627, 632 (1996).
47. Siegel, supra note 45, at 414; CAROLE SMITH & JANETTE LOGAN, AFTER ADOPTION:
DIRECT CONTACT AND RELATIONSHIPS 121 (2004). Extended birth family members may also be part
of this extended kin group. Id. at 92; Ryburn, supra note 46; Siegel, supra note 45, at 414.
48. E. Wayne Carp, Introduction to ADOPTION IN AMERICA 1, 3 (E. Wayne Carp, ed., 2004).
Of course, like the United States, in England there were other methods for transfer of custody to
other persons outside the family, a transfer that could be, in effect, irreversible. See, e.g., Danaya
Wright, A Crisis of Child Custody: A History of the Birth of Family Law in England, 11 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 175, 183–90 (2002) (describing custody disputes between parents and third parties in
the 1700s).
49. Annette R. Appell, Legal Intersections, 3 ADOPTION Q. 85, 88 (2000); see also Carp,
supra note 48, at 5–6 (describing this movement and how the early statues permitted adoption by ―fit
and proper‖ parents).
50. Carp, supra note 48, at 4; Appell, supra note 44, at 1004; Stephen B. Presser, The
Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 461–60 (1971); see also
CARP, supra note 39, at 6–7 (discussing private acts and the use of testamentary adoption prior to the
generalized adoption statutes). Note that Texas and Mississippi were the first states to adopt general
adoption statutes but they were less robust statutes than Massachusetts and its progeny. Carp, supra
note 48, at, 5. These earlier statutes merely permitted adopters to make public a private adoption
arrangement, ―analogous to recording a deed for a piece of land.‖ Id.
51. CARP, supra note 39, at 5.
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disruption of biological connections to create a new set of legal family
relationships was, arguably, a modern creation; this development became
conceivable as society was undergoing a shift in political philosophy
from one based on divine rule to one based on consent.52 This turn itself
was tied to a notion that children were undeveloped and in need of care.53
This shift toward adoption also coincided with the transition from an
agricultural to an industrial and more urban economy that increasingly
separated home and work, creating the social conditions for the modern
nuclear family. 54 Children without such a family, those born to single
mothers, other families without the means to care for children, and those
children themselves working to support the family, became objects of the
child saving movement. 55 This movement, which would eventually
evolve into our present-day child welfare system,56 coincided with, if not
contributed to, the enactment of adoption laws.57 It would be some time,
however, until the child welfare establishment embraced adoption as a
service for children in need of protection.58
Although adoption law has remained unchanged in its core principle,
which was to terminate and recreate a legal parent-child relationship,
adoption became confidential and anonymous over time. It was not until
early in the twentieth century when adoption court proceedings and
records became confidential.59 Eventually, authorities began to issue new

52. HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT 17–44 (2005).
53. See id. (tracing the changing view of political authority from the seventeenth to
nineteenth centuries in America from birth right to consent, and the corresponding change in the
conception of childhood as one of incompetence rather than entitlement dictated by birth).
54. STACEY, supra note 1, at 38–40. Indeed, in pre-modern colonial times, family boundaries
were porous and not dictated by blood, primarily because of the pervasiveness of voluntary and
involuntary indentured servitude. CARP, supra note 39, at 6. Adoption historian Wayne Carp
explains that ―colonial American family life was far from the stable, nuclear family so idealized by
many twentieth-century Americans: a substantial number of colonial American children grew up in
families other than their own, many with the consent of their parents.‖ Id.
55. See DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 13–14 (2d ed. 2004); Gordon, supra
note 16; JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN‘S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY OF ADVOCACY AND
PROTECTION 17–24 (1991) (each describing this movement).
56. Appell, supra note 17, at 158–59.
57. Presser, supra note 50, at 488–89; Leo A. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and
Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 748 (1956). Wayne Carp notes that the early adoption laws were
developed in response to an ―increase in the number of middle-class farmers who wished to legalize
the addition‖ to their family of out-placed children the child savers sent out west as farm laborers.
CARP, supra note 39, at 11.
58. CARP, supra note 39, at 15–18 (describing the preference for keeping families together
and the stigma attached to adoption as being unnatural and ―second-rate‖).
59. Id. at 38–39. In the early days of adoption, birth records were not routinely or uniformly
kept. Id. at 36–39. In fact, it was not until the 1930s that states began to issue new birth certificates
that reflected the adoption and even then, the original certificates remained unsealed for decades.
Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to
Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 376 (2001).
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birth certificates for the adoptee and sealed the original certificates. 60
Initially, the point of sealing birth and adoption records from the public
view was to protect the unwed mother and the ―illegitimate‖ child, but
the records remained open to the parties to the adoption.61 Indeed, as late
as the mid-1900s adoption professionals expected that adult adoptees
would seek information about their family origins.62 By that time though
infant adoption had become more common, and even dominant, in
response to a series of social changes relating to a growth in infertility,
the availability of infant formula, and changing psychological theories
that began to view environment as more important than genes in child
development. 63 It was not too long after infant adoption became
normative that courts, public officials and agencies sealed birth and
adoption records from the parties themselves.64
Before the sealing of adoption records, first from the public and then
from the parties, social workers assumed that a child during his or her
childhood would be firmly within the new family, but that adoptees
might be interested in their origins once they were adults. 65 Yet even
during the adoptee‘s minority, social workers would accommodate the
requests of adoptive parents to find information about birth relatives and
even viewed the birth mothers as still connected to the child. 66 For
example, social workers might reflexively inform a birth parent when the
child she gave up for adoption was ill or had died. 67 Implicitly these
60. CARP, supra note 39, at 52–55. Even after these new birth certificates were issued, there
was no intention initially and as late as the middle of the twentieth century to keep a child‘s original
birth certificate or identity from the adoptee. Id. 53–55. On the contrary, adoption professionals
―anticipated that children born out of wedlock would naturally inquire about their family origins
when grown and believed that there was something inherently right about preserving an accurate
account of the past.‖ Id. at 52. See also Samuels, supra note 59, for a thorough legal history of the
confidentiality of adoption records.
61. CARP, supra note 39, at 48–55.
62. Id. at 52. While it became standard practice to issue new birth certificates reflecting that
the adoptee was the child of the adoptive parents ―[t]here [was] no evidence that child welfare or
pubic health officials ever intended that issuing new birth certificates to adopted children would
prevent them from gaining access to their original one.‖ Id. at 54–55; see also Samuels, supra note
59, at 387–92 (describing the differences between child welfare and vital statistics views regarding
access to birth records).
63. Appell, supra note 44, at 1004–05; see also CARP, supra note 39, at 27–29 (noting the
change in the view of adopted children as genetically inferior and doomed during the 1920s and
1930s, the drastic increase of out-of-wedlock births and during and after World War II, and the
ability to diagnose infertility by the 1950s); Appell, supra note 17, at 158–59.
64. Samuels, supra note 59, at 406–08. Most states closed their adoption court records by the
1950s. Id. at 377–78. In 1960 though, adult adoptees in twenty states still had access to their original
birth certifications. Id. at 378. Birth records remained open to adult adoptees in most of these states
until 1979. Id. at 382.
65. Id. at 374–78.
66. CARP, supra note 39, 74–80.
67. Id. at 79.
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social workers understood that the ties between mother and child were
deep and lasting. Similarly, adoption agencies might provide information
about an adopted child‘s siblings at the request of the adoptive parents.68
There appeared to be no doubt that adopted adults should have access to
identifying and other information about their birth families.69
The real break between birth and adoptive families seems to have
arisen with the development and popularization of psychoanalytic and
child development theories after World War II. 70 Those theories
pathologized unwed mothers, designating them as ―neurotic‖ women
who were immature and would neglect their children. 71 Moreover,
psychological theories favored nurture over nature, holding that the
unmarried mother‘s immorality and other perceived defects would not
genetically transmit to her children.72 According to this zeitgeist, it was
best to separate white non-marital children 73 from this pathology and
immorality and place them into a new, normal family.74 In addition, child
development theory suggested that this transfer occur as soon after birth
as possible.75 Thus, the child, unburdened by genetic determinism, could
be raised without knowledge or the influence of the birth mother‘s
pathology and be reared instead in the healthy and wholesome, new,
marital, adoptive family.
Finally, the post-war emphasis on family and the non-normativity of
childless couples also militated toward an anonymous adoption
solution.76 Infertile couples could adopt infants and raise them as their
own. As adoption scholar Elizabeth Samuels asserts, adoption became
the ―perfect and complete substitute for creating a family through
childbirth.‖77 Under these new social conditions, the adoption paradigm

68. Id. at 75 (reporting on a adoptive parents requesting adoption agencies to help them put
children in touch with their siblings or mothers). This is not to suggest that adoption agencies
encouraged post-adoption contact, but merely that they may have responded openly and helpfully to
inquiries from adoptive parents, adopted adults and even birth parents, at least in the early to mid1900s. Id. at 71–89.
69. Id. at 73–74; Samuels, supra note 59, at 377–78.
70. Samuels, supra note 59, at 406–10.
71. CARP, supra note 39, at 113–17.
72. Samuels, supra note 59, at 406; see also CARP, supra note 39, at 113–17 (tracing the rise
of psychological theories that held that unwed mothers were neurotic and whose children should be
removed for their own sake and for the sake of the mother‘s mental health).
73. See RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUZIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE
ROE V. WADE (1992) (describing differential legal and social responses to African-American and
white single mothers and their children).
74. CARP, supra note 39, at 115–16; Samuels, supra note 59, at 402–07.
75. CARP, supra note 39, at 116.
76. Samuels, supra note 59, at 406–08.
77. Id. at 406–07; see also, Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Things?, 52 DUKE L.
J. 1077 (2003) (tracing and contextualizing the social and legal history of adoption law).
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became one of fictive birth that substituted the adoptive parents for the
birth parents on the birth certificate and eventually sealed the original
birth certificate even from adoptees of any age.78 Under this view, it was
best for the birth mother to go on with her life and have nothing to do
with the child; for the child to have no contact with or contamination by
the birth mother; and for the adoptive parents to act as if the adopted
child were their own genetic offspring.79
In substance, this unitary approach provided solely for confidential,
static adoptive relationships that terminated all pre-birth connections and
sealed all birth records. This rebirth paradigm and its accompanying
anonymity became the normative model of adoption even for related
adoptions and adoptions of older children.80 The only major changes in
adoption law until the 1990s related to the inclusion of putative fathers as
legal parents81 and stepparent adoption.82 Otherwise, the law of secrecy
and anonymity persisted, even as older children were adopted from foster
care and stepparents adopted their stepchildren, many of whom knew
their birth parents.
What has remained in most states is adoption‘s heteronormative
frame that views families as heterosexual, marital, and exclusively twoparent. Although single people can adopt, two persons may only adopt if
they are married.83 Moreover, adoption terminates the parental rights of
the biological parents, except in the case of a stepparent adoption in
which case the custodial parent could retain his or her parental rights
while her spouse adopted the child.84 In the process, the child loses the

78. Samuels, supra note 59, at 367–437. Still, at least two states never sealed these records
and several states have since opened them. Id. at 380–81, 431–34. For a current list of open records
laws, see the American Adoption Congress website, http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org
/state.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
79. See infra. Sec. II.C (describing changes in adoption starting in the 1990s, including samesex couple adoption and adoption with contact).
80. See Samuels, supra note 59, at 403–08 (describing the social and legal norms that
portrayed adoptive families as a simple substitute for birth families).
81. These changes occurred as a result of the United States Supreme Court holding in Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), which held that a non-marital father had a right to process before the
state could remove his children.
82. Professor June Carbone marks the beginning of stepparent adoption in 1925 with
Marshall v. Marshall, 239 P. 36 (Cal. 1925). June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in Winning Public
Recognition for Adult Partnerships, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 341, 385 (2006).
83. Annette R. Appell, Lesbian & Gay Adoption, 4 ADOPTION Q. 75, 79–80 (2001). This
marriage requirement probably reflects the normativity of the connection between marriage and
childrearing rather than any conscious attempt to prohibit two unmarried people from adopting. See,
e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993) (finding no legislative intent to
prohibit non-marital couples from adopting); In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006) (same). But see, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1060 (Conn. 1999) (holding
that the Connecticut legislature intended for only married couples to adopt).
84. Appell, supra note 83, at 79.
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legal connection, including the right to visitation and to one of his or her
parents. In its attempt to replicate heteronormativity, adoption provided
that adoptive children could have no more than two parents, as if they
were born through the union of their adoptive parents.
C. Opening Adoption
Changing social norms and family structures in the last half of the
twentieth century and early part of the twenty-first century have
challenged this heteronormative model of adoption as families are
increasingly and legally formed and reformed without mutual biological
connection, as in the case of stepparent and lesbian and gay adoption. In
fact, courts and even legislatures are permitting same-sex couples to
adopt children together. 85 These changes preserve the core aspects of
parental status and rights, including the prohibition on more than two
legal parents, but they cut off almost every legal tie between the adoptee
and his or her birth family—parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, and
grandparents.86 Yet while law largely retains a heteronormative, nuclear
family structure, families that are non-heterosexual, reformed, or simply
non-nuclear are quite common. In addition, the children of these
families—as children and adults—have pushed against this structure in
their pursuit of biological family relations, challenging the secrecy and
myth in adoption. 87 Thus, despite the tenacity of the nuclear,
heteronormative family, lesbian and gay parenthood and other economic
and social changes have diluted heteronormativity and destabilized
nuclear families such that social family boundaries are more permeable.
These postmodern families and the porousness of their affective, if
not legal, family relations are part of a larger set of movements that have
challenged adoption‘s myth of rebirth and mandate of secrecy. What
goes around comes around and so it has been with adoption. Where once
unwed, stigmatized, birth mothers‘ only choice was to relinquish their
85. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(f) (West 2005); CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724 (West
2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-312(a) (LexisNexis 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204 (2002);
Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); In
re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006); In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d
267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of
M.A., 930 A.2d 1088 (Me. 2007); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of Carolyn B.,
774 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002); In re
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); see also Tenn. Atty Gen. (Oct. 10, 2007). Op. No.
07-140. (opining that if the adoption is ―found to be in the best interest of the child, there is no
prohibition in Tennessee adoption statutes against adoption by a same sex couple‖).
86. See infra Sec. III.B and text accompanying notes 173–184.
87. Appell, supra note 44, at 1008–13.
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babies for adoption and there was a corresponding abundance of infants
available for adoption, in their stead arose greater reproductive choice
and acceptance of single, unwed motherhood.88 These changes resulted
in a near dearth of infants but also an abundance of older children in the
adoption pool.89 These older children, primarily step and foster children,
often knew and even continued to know their birth parents, thus making
the rebirth theme of adoption less tenable. 90 Moreover, as a result of
increased reproductive choice and changing legal and social mores
regarding the validity of anonymous adoption, there has been a rise of
openness in adoption.91
In addition, mental health and adoption experts have noted that
adoptees have great and nearly universal interest in their origins. 92
Quantitative and qualitative studies, as well as the theoretical literature,
have found that the vast majority of adoptees are curious about their birth
families,93 think about them at various rites of social and developmental
passage, 94 and have an interest in meeting their birth parents. 95 Social
science research points to the importance of knowledge about birth
connections to the development of adoptees‘ identity. 96 Psychologists
understand that questions about birth families and birth histories play an
important and persistent role in an adoptive child‘s development and that
adoptees have ongoing questions about their adoption.97 These questions
may include why they were adopted, what their birth parents are like and
what they look like, their national heritage, whom they resemble, and
what genes they may be passing on to their children.98 It is now widely
88. Psychological and social theories evolved to view single parenthood as less pathological.
CARP, supra note 39, at 201. This view that single mothers are pathological, however, is still widely
held, primarily in the context of poor and African American families. Appell, supra note 17.
89. CARP, supra note 39, at 201–03; Appell, supra note 44, at 1008–09.
90. Appell, supra note 44, at 1014–20.
91. See CARP, supra note 39, at 196–201 (tracing the critiques of adoption and the movement
toward openness).
92. E.g., RUTH MCROY ET AL., CHANGING PRACTICES IN ADOPTION 20 (1994).
93. E.g., id. (describing a large, longitudinal study which revealed that regardless of whether
they were in open or closed adoptions, ―[v]irtually all of the children . . . wanted to know more about
their birth parents.‖); PETER L. BENSON ET AL., GROWING UP ADOPTED 26 (1994) (one of the largest
studies of adolescent adoptees found that over 80% of adoptees adopted as infants were curious
about their birth parents).
94. BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 33.
95. BENSON ET AL., supra note 93, at 26 (finding that 70% of adolescent girls and 57% of
adolescent boys expressed an interest in actually meeting their birth parents).
96. See BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 12–14; REITZ & WATSON, supra note 33;
Sants, supra note 33; Kenneth W. Watson, The Case for Open Adoption, Fall PUB. WELFARE 24
(1988).
97. BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 12–14; REITZ & WATSON, supra note 33; Sants,
supra note 33.
98. BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 33.
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understood among mental health experts that adoptees continue to be
members of their adoptive and birth families.99
Thus, adoption has entered yet another phase as it seeks to
accommodate these new perspectives on identity, family, and biological
connection. Although records continue to be sealed in most states (even
from adult adoptees) 100 and confidentiality continues to envelop court
proceedings and adoption agency records, adoptive and birth families, on
their own and increasingly with the assistance of child welfare and
adoption agencies, are forging new adoption practices and even new
adoption and biological kin networks. These open relationships run a
spectrum from the exchange of information between the two sets of
parents to ongoing exchange of letters and pictures or visits all the way
to shared vacations.
Generally, these post-adoption relationships are privately ordered
and maintained. In other words, open adoption arrangements are
informal and based on the agreement of those people involved,
agreements that do not carry the force of legal sanction should any of the
parties chose to discontinue or otherwise stray from the agreed terms. 101
In other cases, these ongoing contact relationships are court-ordered or
court-sanctioned. 102 Court-ordered open adoption is an incursion into
family autonomy and may be problematic in light of research that
suggests that the adoptive parents‘ comfort with and sense of control
over post-adoption contact is a significant indicator of success of such
relationships. 103 Court sanctioned post-adoption contact is arguably
preferable because it allows the persons involved in the contact to
determine what is best for them in the first instance, with resort to the
court as an option should disagreements later arise.104
This latter type of open adoption provides a new form of adoption in
which the parties agree, as part of the adoption, to be bound by their
post-adoption contact agreements. In part a response to the prevalence of

99. See id. at 12–14; REITZ & WATSON, supra note 33; Sants, supra note 33, at 133; Watson,
supra note 96, at 24.
100. MADELYN FREUNDLICH, FOR THE RECORDS: RESTORING A RIGHT TO ADULT ADOPTEES
10–11
(Nov.
2007),
available
at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications
/2007_11_For_Records.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
101. Annette R. Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative Adoption: Can it
Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L. Q. 483, 500–01 (1996).
102. Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post Adoption Contact Statutes, Part II: Court-Imposed
Post Adoption Contact, 4 ADOPTION Q. 101 (2000) [hereinafter Appell, Part II]; Annette R. Appell,
Enforceable Post-Adoption Contact Statutes, Part I: Adoption with Contact, 4 ADOPTION Q. 82
(2000) [hereinafter Appell, Part I].
103. HAROLD D. GROTEVANT & RUTH G. MCROY, OPENNESS IN ADOPTION 16 (1998).
104. Annette R. Appell, Survey of State Utilization of Adoption with Contact, 6 ADOPTION Q.
75 (2003).
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open adoption and concerns regarding fairness issues in the private
ordering prevalent in open adoption, 105 this new statutory form of
adoption reflects the different but deep and pervasive roles of social and
biological kinship. These statutes do not supplant the private
arrangements, but instead make clear which arrangements are formal and
enforceable and which are informal and unenforceable. Those open
adoption agreements entered into outside these mechanisms continue to
be unregulated and are most likely more common than the statutory
agreements.
This codification, known also as cooperative adoption or adoption
with contact, represents a model of accommodation of family privacy
and the existential facts of adoption: that the birth family and adoptive
family are tied together through the child; and adopted children are
members of two families. Approximately twenty states have adoption
with contact statutes.106 These statutes allow adoptive parents and birth
relatives or others at, or before, the time of adoption to enter into
enforceable agreements for post-adoption contact, such as visitation or
correspondence.107 The statutes do not permit approval or enforcement of
post-adoption contact plans unless the adoptive parents and the party
who will have contact agree to such a plan at or before the time of
adoption.108 Nor do they permit the failure of post-adoption contact to
invalidate the adoption.109 They do present a significant incursion into
the legal and social paradigm of adoption as rebirth. Adoption with
contact both acknowledges the child‘s pre-adoptive birth ties and brings
these connections forward into the adoption, often as a part of the
adoption decree itself. In this way, the statutes in effect create a new type
of adoption in the sense that from the start, the parties are committed to
ongoing cooperation around the child.

105. Id. at 79 (finding that these concerns have led a number of states to codify such
adoptions).
106. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-116.01 (1999); Cal. Fam. Code § 8616.5 (West 2008); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45a-715(h)–(n) (West 2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.0427 (2001); Ind. Code Ann. §
31-19-16-1 to 8 (1994); La. Child. Code. Ann. art. 1269.1–1269.7 (2001); Md. Fam. Code. Ann. §§
5-308, 5-3A-08, 5-3B-07 (West 2006); see also Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 5-331, 5-345 (West
2006); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 210, §§ 6C, 6D, 6E (West 1999); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.58
(West 1997); Mont. Code Ann. § 42-5-301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-162 to 165 (1993); Nev.
Rev. Stat. §§127.187, 127.1875, 127.188, 127.1885, 127.189, 127.1895 (2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. §
32A-5-35 (West 1993); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 112-b (McKinney 2005); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §
383-c(5)(b)(ii) (McKinney 2005) (as amended in 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305 (1993); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-7-14.1 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-112
(1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.295 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-22-704(e) (1997).
107. Appell, supra note 104 at 76–77.
108. Id. at 76.
109. Id. at 76–77.
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Open adoption, particularly as it is regulated through adoption with
contact, exemplifies preciousness of biological connections and the
various types of parenting relationships adults can have with children
that are both non-exclusive but also deeply protective of family privacy
and autonomy. The open adoptive family preserves the connection
between parent and child while creating at least one new non-biological
parent in the child‘s life. Adoption with contact serves both to regulate
these relationships and make clear whether the non-legal parent has any
enforceable right to ongoing contact should disagreements regarding the
contact arise.110 As discussed below, such a regime could help clarify the
rights (or lack of rights) of the biological parents in the satellite of samesex couple families.111
These changes in adoption law and practice hold lessons for lesbian
and gay single parents and same-sex couples who cannot reproduce
without the reproductive tissue or labor of someone with whom they are
not intimate. These families and adoptive families are similar in that they
deviate from the two-biological-parent (in this sense, heterosexual)
family, even while they reflect that family form; lesbian, gay, and
adoptive families are frequently created through the non-sexual
reproduction of children using assisted reproductive technologies (ART)
and adoption or other legal mechanisms; 112 and they each contain the
actual or lurking presence of other relations (e.g., biological mother or
father, siblings). Nevertheless, families in open-adoption are not trying to
escape the pull of biology; on the contrary, they are embracing it.113 It
appears that lesbian and gay families too may be embracing biological
connections.114
III. SAME-SEX PARENTS: LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES AND THE
MISSING BIOLOGICAL PARENT
Lesbian and gay couples cannot create children together without
assistance from third (and even fourth) parties. Yet many lesbian and gay
couples are parenting children.115 These parenting relationships may have
110. Id. at 83–84.
111. See infra Sec. IV.
112. Fiona Tasker, Lesbian Mothers, Gay Fathers, and Their Children: A Review, 26 DEV. &
BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 224, 224–25 (2005).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 102–116.
114. See infra Sec. III.A–B.
115. The 2000 census estimated that 27% of same-sex couples have a minor child living in the
home. GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/
FinalAdoptionReport.pdf. The census did not count children in those homes, but estimates place the
number of children living with lesbian and gay parents anywhere from just under two million to
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originated in a variety of ways including during previous heterosexual
relationships, foster care or adoption, and assisted reproduction.
Moreover, states are beginning to give lesbian and gay couples quasi- or
actual marital status that entitles these couples to be treated the same as
married couples under all aspects of family law. 116 For example, a
handful of states apply marital presumptions to children born to couples
in civil unions117 and permit lesbians and gays to adopt their partner‘s
child just as a stepparent would. 118 Thus, the newly recognized
homosexual families resemble traditional notions of intimate adult
relationships as coupled, monogamous, and financially productive and
intertwined unions. In all of these instances, the children reared by
lesbian and gay couples have more than two parents. Yet, the law
recognizes at most two parents. 119 So far lesbian and gay families
receiving family status appear to be quite conventional—almost
heteronormative except that they are same-sex. 120 Indeed, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court defined the same-sex
relationships that are entitled to marital recognition as those couples who
―are willing to embrace marriage‘s solemn obligations of exclusivity,
mutual support, and commitment to one another . . . .‖121
Despite concerns of social conservatives that recognizing lesbian and
gay couples will undermine heterosexual norms, 122 the assimilation
fourteen million. William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and
America’s Children, 15 FUTURE OF CHILD. 97, 98 (2005) (estimating one-hundred sixty-six
thousand); Tasker, supra note 112, at 224 (estimating two to fourteen million).
116. CAL. FAM CODE § 297.5 (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38aa-38pp, 2006; New
Jersey, An Act Concerning Civil Unions, 37 P.L. 2006, Art. 6, 15; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1204
(2000). Regarding marriage: Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
117. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.01 (West 2001) (permitting domestic partners to recover
like spouses for negligent infliction of emotional distress); New Jersey, An Act Concerning Civil
Unions, 37 P.L. 2006, Art. 6, ¶ 92 (―Whenever in any law, rule, regulation, judicial or administrative
proceeding or otherwise, reference is made to ‗marriage,‘ ‗husband,‘ ‗wife,‘ ‗spouse,‘ ‗family,‘
‗immediate family,‘ ‗dependent,‘ ‗next of kin,‘ ‗widow,‘ ‗widower,‘ ‗widowed,‘ or another word
which in a specific context denotes a marital or spousal relationship, the same shall include a civil
union pursuant to the provisions of this act.‖).
118. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b); New Jersey, An Act Concerning Civil Unions, 37 P.L.
2006, Art. 6, ¶ 5(d).
119. See infra Sec. II.
120. Infra text accompanying notes 124–132. Their children appear to have appropriated
heterosexual norms as well. See Beth Perry et al., Children’s Play Narratives: What They Tell Us
About Lesbian-Mother Families, 74 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 467, 476 (2004) (noting that children
in both single heterosexual and lesbian parent families, children chose a male doll to represent the
second parent. Thus even these lesbian-parented children ―have a clear idea of what constitutes a
traditional family and of social norms‖ either because they are conforming to social expectations or
that ―parents are just seen as parents regardless of their sex.‖).
121. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965.
122. E.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Parentlessness: Adoption Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and
Parameters 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 323, 362–68 (2004) (expressing concerns that,
among other things, same-sex adoption does not reflect traditional heterosexual parenting).
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reflected in same-sex parent adoption appears to reinforce notions that
families are nuclear, monogamous, and economically autonomous.123 In
fact, feminist, gay, and other critical theorists identify and question the
exclusionary and, perhaps, stultifying, aspects of assimilation. By
embracing dominant liberal norms that naturalize and privatize the
family, these critics suggest that legal recognition of these traditional
non-traditional families fails to acknowledge, let alone address, the
problematic aspects of this model.124 These problems include the model‘s
failure to counter the inequality-producing and inequality-maintaining
aspects of the economically and legally private family125 or to account
for the variety of family formations and lesbian and gay identities. 126
Instead, same-sex adoption appears to reinforce social and legal norms
regarding adult and family relationships, protecting individual
relationships while leaving legal, social, and economic structures intact.
Moreover, even the frameworks for assessing lesbian and gay parented
families utilize ―heterosexual-parent households as the gold standard and
implies that differences equal deficits.‖ 127 This measure thus masks
differences between heterosexual and homosexual parenting and avoids
assessments that same-sex parent families may provide different and
positive social and psychological lessons.128
Still, even those lesbian and gay couples who are modeling
heteronormativity—binary couples, mutual support, relationships toward
children that reflect adult intimate relationships, and even exclusive
(legal) parenting—can and do provide examples of more complex and
less domesticated kinship networks that recognize expansive kin
networks. Thus, though critics like Katherine Franke accurately lament
that the lesbian and gay political ―investment in the politics of kinship
has resulted in the atrophying of an ability to critically and creatively
think sexuality outside the domestic couple‖, 129 it may be that in the

123. Angela Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1539,
1567–71 (2006).
124. E.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004);
NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 138–145 (2008); MICHAEL WARNER,
THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL (1999); Harris, supra note 123.
125. Harris, supra note 123, at 1567–71.
126. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 25–52 (1999); Katherine M. Franke,
The Politics Of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 246 (2006)
[hereinafter Franke, Politics]; Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty Of Lawrence v.
Texas, 104 COLUM. LAW. REV. 1399 (2004).
127. Abbie E. Goldberg, (How) Does it Make a Difference? Perspectives of Adults With
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Parents, 77 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 550, 550 (2007).
128. Judith Stacey and T.J. Biblarz, (How) Does the sexual orientation of parents matter?, 65
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 159 (2001).
129. Franke, Politics, supra note 126, at 247.
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context of kinship, lesbian and gay families, despite their apparent
emulation of the private, heterosexual family, are pushing the boundaries
of kinship to be more inclusive and reflective of larger communities
around children.130 This embrace and enlargement of kinship holds the
promise of leading to a broader sense of kinship with broader
communities rather than exclusive nuclear families.
This is because even when lesbian and gay couples have children,
they still do not neatly fit into that two parent biologically-based norm.
The adoption fiction of rebirth is, therefore, more difficult to sustain
simply by virtue of the sex of the parents. There are other people out
there who have reciprocal biological if not affective relationships with
the children. Lesbian adoptions often involve known birth fathers or
sperm donors and gay male adoptions are likely to be as open as other
adoptions.131 Indeed, unlike many heterosexual families created through
ART, lesbians and gays may be more likely to make informal
arrangements with known donors or surrogates to create their families.132
In these cases, the birth parents or donors may be involved with the child
on an ongoing basis. 133 Even when the birth relatives are not active
members of the child‘s life, the adoptive parents, and sometimes the
adoptee, know who the child‘s parents are and can ensure that the child
will know from whence he or she came. In other cases, for example
adoptions from foster care or adoptions by gay male couples, the
adoption may be open with ongoing visitation or other contact. This
contact may be with the birth mother or the extended family.
Still, in all of these cases, the exclusive one or two-parent family
prevails as a legal matter. Thus, despite the physical impossibility of two
parents of the same sex being the exclusive parents of a child, the law
regarding adoption and much reproductive technology recognizes only
two parents; and the law usually defines parents in those contexts around
their relationship with each other, rather than a biological relationship
with the child. As a result, these families may be facing cognitive
dissonance regarding social and biological connections similar to that
faced within adoption under the myth of rebirth. To the extent that
homosexual families are normative in their nuclear structure, they are in
130. See Alenka Švab, New Ways of Parenting: Fatherhood and Parenthood in Lesbian
Families, 38 REVIJA ZA SOCIOLOGIJU 43, 47 (2007) (Although lesbian parents are reflecting
conventional notions of fatherhood, they are also ―playing a subversive role as they are redefining
these discourses and family relations. . . [including] the separation of parenting from the dominant
social meanings of gender and the . . . separation of mothering and fathering from the idea of
common residency . . . [and a] shift . . . to multiple parenthood by including other social parents.‖).
131. See supra Sec. II.B.
132. See supra Sec. II.A.
133. See supra Secs. II.A–B.
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danger of falling into the trap of the closed adoption model. On the other
hand, these lesbian and gay families who are not wedded to the nuclear
structure are finding themselves and their children in larger genetic and
social kinship networks. Thus, although controversy surrounds same-sex
marriage and lesbian and gay families with children, these families
appear to be remarkably similar structurally to other post-modern
families formed through adoption, ART, and remarriage. Many appear to
hew both toward heteronormativity in terms of adult-affective binary and
mutual relationships and toward post-modernity in their expansive kin
networks and embrace of social and biological kin.
A. Lesbian and Gay Families and ART
Lesbians and gays use various reproductive technologies to create
families. Lesbians might use anonymous or known sperm donation and
gay men might engage a surrogate. The children born from these
arrangements have at least two parents: a legal biological parent and a
biological parent. Thus, even for single parent families, the child has
connections to at least one other person who is a parent at least in a
genetic sense. In same-sex couple families who use more exotic
reproductive technologies, children can have a slew of parents: the two
who raise him or her, any gamete donors, and even birth parents. These
families created through reproductive technologies represent perhaps the
biggest departure from the family created as a result of biological
procreation between married couples. Yet, these newest of families too
are rooted in and have not escaped biology; they replicate
heteronormativity through their experience of biological loss and
connection and also in their choices of donors and of family structure.
Sperm donation, and to a lesser extent egg donation, has traditionally
been anonymous, particularly when health care professionals are
involved, and anonymity remains the legal norm in this country.134 This
anonymity arguably promotes donations, 135 but also helps to deny
biological relatedness to the donor, protect the autonomy of the intended
family, and reinforce heteronormativity. Indeed, to further preserve the
nuclear family ideal and mask the missing genetic ties, reproductive
134. Joanna E. Scheib & Rachel A. Cushing, Open-identity donor insemination in the United
States: is it on the rise? 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 231, 231–32 (2007) (noting there are only nine
open donor insemination banks in the United States).
135. See Amy Harmon, Are You My Sperm Donor? Few Clinics Will Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/.national/20donor.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2007) (reporting that donations have dipped in Great Britain since it outlawed anonymous
donations); Scheib & Cushing, supra note 134, at 232 (noting concerns that sperm donations would
dip if the law banned anonymity).
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technology legal regimes often cut off any potential legal relationship
between the donor and the child.136 This, like adoption, is a departure
from biologically-based parenthood norms and yet recalls normative
family forms and structures.
Children born through gamete donation experience similar themes of
connection and identity as adoptive children.137 It is not surprising then
that as assisted reproduction becomes more common and less secretive,
children of donor insemination are expressing interest in having
knowledge of and even contact with their donor parents and siblings.138
These children (and adults) of donor insemination want such knowledge
and contact with the donor to learn more about themselves and complete
their sense of identity.139 Parents choosing open donor insemination do
so to provide their children the option of contacting the donor and to help
ensure that should the child need medical or other information in the
future, it will be accessible.140
Perhaps reflecting the move toward openness in adoption, there is
some movement toward openness in ART.141 This openness extends to
telling the children about their ART origins and to openness regarding
the identity of the donor. 142 Although there are differences regarding
disclosure issues in families created through ART and adoption,143 many
of the same lessons of closed, anonymous adoption underlay this move
toward more honesty regarding genetic parentage.144 Advances in genetic
136. See Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform
Parentage Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN‘S L.J. 163, 169–76 (2007) (tracing these changes).
137. Katrina Hargreaves & Ken Daniels, Parents Dilemmas in Sharing Donor Insemination
Conception Stories with their Children, 21 CHILD. & SOC‘Y 420 (2007); Joanna E. Scheib et al.,
Choosing Between Anonymous and Identity-Release Sperm Donors: Recipient and Donor
Characteristics, 10 REPROD. TECH. 50, 54 (2000).
138. E.g., Joanna E. Scheib et al., Adolescents with Open-Identity Sperm Donors: Reports
from 12–17 Year Olds, 20 HUM. REPROD. 239, 239–52 (2005).
139. E.g., id. at 248.
140. Scheib et al., supra note 137, at 54.
141. Scheib & Cushing, supra note 134. In other parts of the world, the move is clearly toward
openness. See, e.g., Hargreaves & Daniels, supra note 137, at 421–22 (noting legal and practice
changes in New Zealand, UK, and Australia toward making donor identities available to adults born
through donor insemination).
142. Infra text accompanying notes 155–174. ―Guidelines for clinical practice now tend to
include recommendations for openness‖ to children regarding their donor origins. Rachel Cook et
al., Disclosure of Donor Insemination: Parental Attitudes, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 549, 549
(1995) (citing American Fertility Society, 1993; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority,
1993); see also Scheib & Cushing, supra note 134 at 231–32 (noting openness is on the rise);
Nanette Gartrell et al., The National Lesbian Family Study: 4. Interviews With the 10-Year-Old
Children, 75 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 518 (2005) (noting that families were evenly divided
between choosing known and unknown donors).
143. Cook et al., supra note 142, at 558; Ellen Waldman, What Do We Tell the Children?, 35
CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 533–35 (2006).
144. See Hargreaves & Daniels, supra note 137, at 420 (discussing reasons for openness

312

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

science and testing have also no doubt influenced this movement toward
openness, as DNA testing is able to identify parentage and so many other
aspects of a person‘s life.145
Increasingly then, parents and children in families created through
reproductive technologies involving gamete or womb donors experience
second, third, fourth and fifth parents who are not formally part of the
family. For example, a gay male couple might seek a woman to donate
an egg for them to inseminate with one or both of their sperm or the
sperm of another donor; the egg might then be implanted into another
woman‘s womb, producing a child with two to three fathers and two
mothers. Yet, in other ways these families tend to hew toward the
modern family and heteronormativity. Even those who cannot pass as a
traditional family, such as same-sex partners, are likely to choose a donor
with characteristics similar to the non-genetically related parent. 146
Lesbian couples make these choices also to increase the partner‘s
involvement with the donor insemination process and the child they will
share.147
Judith Stacey‘s study of gay male parenting in Los Angeles revealed
the presence both of heteronormative practices and themes and of
blended biological and social families. 148 For example, one Catholic
white male couple comprised two affluent professionals raising three
children born to the same surrogate mother. 149 The men, Eddie and
Charles, have joint legal custody.150 While they share childcare duties,
Charles is the main breadwinner who works outside the home while
Eddie is the primary caregiver for the children.151 Eddie expresses great
satisfaction with the arrangement but fears that he ―may have committed
career suicide by joining the mom‘s club in the neighborhood.‖152
Despite this most traditional, nuclear family arrangement, the
family‘s non-nuclear biological connections have produced an extended

regarding donor insemination).
145. See Byrn, supra note 136, at 171–76 (discussing the development of genetic testing in the
late 1960s and subsequent developments in reproductive technology).
146. Scheib et al., supra note 137, at 55 (noting that 61% of lesbians in the study matched the
donor to the non-genetic parent). The authors of the study noted that ―[a]lthough 74% of our couples
were lesbians, respondents still reported a strong preference that the donor be matched to their
partner, suggesting that matching serves functions beyond concealing non-genetic relatedness
between father and child.‖ Id. at 50.
147. Id. at 55; Caroline Jones, Looking Like a Family: Negotiating Bio-Genetic Continuity in
British Lesbian Families Using Licensed Donor Insemination, 8 SEXUALITIES 221, 225–29 (2005).
148. Stacey, supra note 20.
149. Id. at 27.
150. Stacey, supra note 20.
151. Id. at 36.
152. Id.
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kin network with much social interaction. The eggs of another woman, a
known donor, created all three children. Charles‘s sperm fertilized the
egg that became the daughter; and Eddie‘s sperm fertilized the egg that
would become the twins.153 The same surrogate mother, Sally, carried
these three fertilized eggs to birth. When the twins were born, both Eddie
and Charles, the egg donor, and the Sally‘s husband attended the
surrogate‘s birth. 154 This five-some has stayed in touch since the
children‘s birth.155 Sally and her family have become close to Charles
and Eddie‘s family—close to the point of vacationing together.156 The
children of each family see each other as siblings.157 The egg donor is not
as close, but she visits the children occasionally and has even joined the
extended family on one of their vacations.158 Eddie, the man who fills the
traditional maternal role, and Sally have forged ―an extraordinary, deep,
familial bond‖ and have long, daily phone calls when they are not
otherwise together.159
Lesbian couples creating families through ART also reflect
heteronormativity and challenge it by creating more porous family
boundaries. 160 Lesbian couples simultaneously tend to prefer and use
known donors, to choose donors who reflect them or their partners, and
to want ongoing relationships with the donors. 161 Whether lesbians
privilege the biological connection or the ability to have an ongoing
social relationship with the donor may depend on the level of social
acceptance of homosexuality.162 For example, lesbian parents in Sweden,
which has laws permitting same sex civil unions and adoptions, are more
likely to choose known, participatory donors than lesbians in Ireland, a
country that is more socially conservative and does not provide for

153. Id. at 34–36.
154. Id. at 35–36.
155. Id. at 36.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 36.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Gartrell et al., supra note 142, at 518 (mothers in the study ―were equally
divided in selecting known and unknown donors, [and] expected to discuss the insemination process
with the children when they reached an appropriate age.‖). It is also widely believed that lesbians are
more egalitarian and less role-bound than heterosexuals. Gillian A. Dunne, Opting into Motherhood:
Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries and Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship, 14
GENDER & SEXUALITY 11 (2000). But see Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique Of SecondParent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 17, (1999) (critiquing regressive effects of
heteronormativity among lesbian parents).
161. Dunne, supra note 160, at 15; Scheib et al., supra note 138; Švab, supra note 130, at 47–
48.
162. See Švab, supra note 130, at 46–48 (comparing lesbian choices regarding donor
involvement in Ireland and Sweden).
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lesbian and gay partnership or co-parenting.163 This was true even though
Irish lesbians valued known, involved donors and even though nonmarital fathers have much more limited rights in Ireland than they do in
Sweden. 164 Moreover, Swedish lesbian parents valued donors for the
social role they might play in the child‘s life while Irish lesbian parents
had more restrictive views of the importance of the donor—equating it
primarily with the biological connection.165
In one study of British lesbian couples raising children created
through donor insemination, forty percent of the families had regular
contact with the donors and less frequently the donor was co-parenting,
including providing financial support for the child.166 This contact also
made it more likely that the children would have relationships with the
sperm donors‘ families as well.167 The couples often chose donors who
were friends or family, and the donors took on an avuncular role and
often were referred to as ―uncle.‖168 In a family where the father was
more involved and saw the child every day, one of the mothers stated the
―he has become part of the family . . . in a sense, or we‘ve become part
of his. But we live in two separate homes.‖169
Like Charles and Eddie, above, who took turns providing sperm to
inseminate the children, many lesbian couples alternate childbearing.170
In this way, it appears that same-sex couples create less direct
heteronormative biological connection: instead of a man and a woman
producing a child to whom they are both biologically related, the samesex couples create this connection by trading reproductive roles
regarding the children born into the family. Taking the family as a whole,
then, each parent is biologically related to at least one of the children and
socially related to each of the children. It also enables each parent to
experience biological parenthood. In addition, one of the reasons lesbians
choose known donors and want continued relationships between them
163. Róisín Ryan-Flood, Contested Heteronormativities: Discourses of Fatherhood among
Lesbian Parents in Sweden and Ireland, 8 SEXUALITIES 189, 191–93 (2005).
164. Id. at 193.
165. Id. (―the most dramatic difference between Irish and Swedish participants [in the study]
was that Swedish lesbians were far more likely to choose an involved donor‖ than Irish lesbians).
166. Dunne, supra note 160, at 16, 27.
167. See id. at 24 (describing sperm donor‘s mother as a grandmother to both her son‘s child
and the child‘s sibling, born through the sperm of another donor and to a different mother).
168. Id. at 18, 22. Compare with the gay male family where the surrogate mother was called
―Mama, Sally.‖ Stacey, supra note 20, at 38. It was not uncommon for the sperm donor to be a
friend of one of the partners, even the one who did not give birth. Dunne, supra note 160, at 17–18,
22–24.
169. Dunne, supra note 160, at 26.
170. Id. at 21–22. They may also combine the maternal functions of egg donation and
gestation while utilizing ART to implant one woman‘s fertilized egg into her partner‘s womb. E.g.,
K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
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and their offspring is to provide the child with male role models. 171
Indeed, the very ―ideology of parenting whereby children require access
to a ‗male role model‘ father‖ 172 suggests a significant amount of
conventionality among lesbian families who seem to be tweaking, rather
than rejecting, heteronormativity. Other lesbian parents who do not want
donor involvement may replicate the binary parent aspects of
heteronormativity by rejecting the notion of three parents.173
B. Lesbian and Gay Adoption
In addition to using ART, lesbians and gays create families while in
heterosexual relationships and through adoption, even while openly
acknowledging their sexual orientation.174 Sources estimate that fifty-two
thousand lesbians and gay men in the United States have become legal
parents through adoption.175 When lesbians and gays bring children to
the relationship from a prior relationship, adoption law governs their
options for establishing parental rights and responsibilities for the second
parent. State adoption laws, however, closely reflect remarkably similar
norms regarding families and parenting in that they model exclusive
parenting, two-parent marital families, or single parents. 176 Adoption
generally does not countenance as parents persons who are not
romantically intimate with each other, such as a gay male couple and the
birth mother, two siblings, or a grandmother and her daughter;177 instead,
most states‘ adoption laws contemplate single or married parents or
persons who act like married couples.178
Four states have statutes that specifically permit or prohibit lesbian
and gay adoption: Florida, which prohibits lesbian and gay adoption;179

171. Dunne, supra note 160; Ryan-Flood, supra note 163, at 196. Studies also revealed that
lesbians preferred gay men as involved fathers because they shared a ―common history of
oppression‖ and lesbians perceived gay men to be more committed to the child and less likely to
seek custody. Id. at 199–200; Catherine Donovan, Who Needs a Father? Negotiating Biological
Fatherhood in British Lesbian Families Using Self-Insemination, 3 SEXUALITIES 149, 155 (2000).
172. Ryan-Flood, supra note 163, at 198. According to Fiona Tasker, one older ―study
reported that children from lesbian mother families were more likely than children from single
heterosexual mother families to visit their nonresident father on a regular basis.‖ Tasker, supra note
112, at 25.
173. Donovan, supra note 171, at 158.
174. Approximately 35% of lesbians and 16% of gay men have children, for a total of 65,500
children being raised by a lesbian or gay parent. GATES ET AL., supra note 115, at 7.
175. Id. at 7. That amounts to 4% of adopted children in the United States. Id. at 11.
176. Appell, supra note 83, at 79.
177. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2007) (refusing to
permit the mother‘s brother to adopt the child as a co-parent).
178. Appell, supra note 83, at 79.
179. Florida‘s ban, enacted in 1977, states: ―No person eligible to adopt under this statute may
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Mississippi, which prohibits ―couples of the same gender‖ from
adopting; 180 and Connecticut and California, which provide explicit
procedures for lesbian and gay couples to adopt.181 Oklahoma was a fifth
state, but its prohibition of the recognition of same-sex couple adoptions
from foreign jurisdictions182 may be null since the Tenth Circuit Federal
Court of Appeals found that it violated the Constitution‘s Full Faith and
Credit Clause.183 In addition, Utah has a ban that would preclude many
lesbian and gays from adopting.184
Other states have more traditional adoption laws that do not
expressly refer to single or same-sex couple adoption. The biggest
roadblock to same-sex couple adoptions may be the absence of special
provisions for non-marital couple adoption. The heteronormativity of
virtually all adoption statutes contemplates adoption by one person or
two married persons and mandates that the legal parents will lose
parental rights before an adoption can occur, except in stepparent
adoptions.185 On their face, these statutes appear to require termination of
parental rights of the legal parent seeking to have her lesbian partner
adopt the child. 186 Similarly, the literal language of the statutes might
suggest that same-sex couples cannot jointly adopt an infant or foster
child not related to either of them because the statutes provide for a
―person‖ or ―married couple‖ to petition for adoption. 187 Although a
number of courts have read ―person‖ in the plural,188 other states courts
have interpreted the statute to permit only one member of the couple to
adopt, for in all states but Massachusetts (and arguably Iowa), lesbians
adopt if that person is a homosexual.‖ FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2000).
180. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2000).
181. Cal. Fam. Code 9000(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-724(a)(3)
(West 2004).
182. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, 7502B1.4(A) (West 2007) (prohibiting the ―state, any of its
agencies, or any court of this state . . . [to] recognize an adoption by more than one individual of the
same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction.‖).
183. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
184. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (Lexis 2002 & 2007 Supp.). Utah prohibits adoption ―by
a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the
laws of this state. For purposes of this Subsection (3)(b), ‗cohabiting‘ means residing with another
person and being involved in a sexual relationship with that person.‖ Single lesbians and gays
presumably could adopt.
185. Appell, supra note 83, at 79 (citing e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9.3-43 (―any person may
institute an action for adoption . . . .‖); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §110 (an ―adult unmarried person or an
adult husband and his adult wife together may adopt another person‖); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15A, § 1105 (―all parental rights of each former parent of the adoptee terminate‖ upon adoption); D.C. Code
Ann. § 16-312(a) (―A final decree of adoption establishes the relationship of natural parent and
natural child between adopter and adoptee for all purposes . . . .‖)).
186. Appell, supra note 83, at 75.
187. Id. at 79.
188. Id. at 83.
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and gays cannot get married.189
The trend appears to be in favor of permitting lesbian and gay and
same-sex adoption.190 Even though the best interests of the child standard
may provoke more scrutiny for lesbian and gay adoptions,191 it has more
often than not been utilized to grant adoptions.192 In fact, the reported
decisions suggest that courts confronted with lesbian and gay families
that embody dominant marital norms of monogamy, financial security,
mutual care and support, and psychological parenting193 find adoption to
be in the child‘s best interest despite lack of clear statutory support for
such non-marital, two-parent adoptions.194
In any event, adoption law and practice appear to require lesbians
and gay men to conform to modern heterosexual norms to adopt. For
example, adoption agencies may deem a gay man unsuitable to adopt if
he has a domestic partner who does not want to be an adoptive parent.195
This happened with one gay man Judith Stacey studied who wanted to
adopt a child but his live-in lover did not.196 The county adoption agency
189. See Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Varnum v. Brien,
Case No. CV5965 (Aug. 30, 2007, Iowa Dist. Ct., Polk County).
190. Compare, e.g.,, In re K.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. 1995), and In re Infant
Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. App. 2006), and In re K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004),
and In re M.M.G.C. 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), and In re Sharon S., 31 Cal. 4th 417, 73
P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003), and In re R.B.F. & R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002), and In re H.N.R., 666
A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), and In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995),
and In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995), and In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993), and
In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B, 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (all permitting same-sex couple
adoption under traditional adoption statutes), with In re Luke, 640 N.W. 2d 374 (Neb. 2002), and In
re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999), and Matter of Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d
488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), and In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wisc.1994) (all rejecting
same-sex partner adoption under traditional adoption statutes). Recently, over half a dozen states
have extended marital rights, including same-sex parent adoption, to same-sex couples. Cal. Fam.
Code § 297.5 (West 2005); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-38bb (West Supp. 2007); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
ch. 457-A (Supp. 2007); N.J. Stat. Ann. 9:3-37 (West Supp. 2007); Oregon Family Fairness Act,
Oregon Laws 2007, ch. 99; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). As noted above, fewer states ban lesbian and gay single or couple
adoption.
191. E.g., In re C.M.A., 715 N.E. 2d 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (noting that same-sex couple
adoptions receive greater scrutiny than stepparent adoptions). In any event, it is difficult to assess
conclusively how courts are responding to petitions lesbian and gay single and same-sex couple
adoptions because adoption proceedings are closed, sealed and usually uncontested so they rarely
yield published decisions. Because the proceedings themselves are sealed, research is challenging.
192. E.g., In re Adoption of Carolyn B., 774 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); In re
R.B.F. & R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002).
193. See Jane Spinak, When Did Lawyers For Children Stop Reading Goldstein, Freud And
Solnit? Lessons From The Twentieth Century On Best Interests and The Role Of The Child
Advocate, 41 FAM. L.Q. 393 (2007) (providing an excellent overview and assessment of the
influential work of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit which privileged children‘s affective relationships
with their care givers, also known as the psychological parent standard).
194. Appell, supra note 83.
195. Stacey, supra note 20, at 37.
196. Id.
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required the prospective adoptive parent to terminate his relationship
with the partner who did not want parent in order to be considered as an
adoption resource.197 The agency could not fathom that one man would
adopt and his partner would not, so it required the non-paternal half of
the couple to participate in the adoption as a condition to permitting the
man who wanted the children to adopt.198 In other words, to adopt as a
single person, the adoption seeker would have to be single in fact, even if
marriage was not legally available to him. 199 In this way, the agency
appropriated heterosexual norms that couple adult intimacy with child
bearing and raising.
In addition, rearing children may provide some measure of
heterosexual privilege, acceptance, and naturalness. That was the case for
this same adoption seeker whose partner did not want to adopt. Once he
and his partner separated, in large part because the agency required it, the
county allowed the adoption seeker to become licensed and eventually
adopt. 200 After that, he gained great currency with his family and
especially his mother who initially did not accept her son‘s
homosexuality.201 After he became a parent she came to admire him over
all of her other children for his good parenting and treatment of her, his
mother.202
Despite their apparent tendency toward conventionality, the adoption
fiction of rebirth is more difficult to sustain for same-sex adoptive
families simply by virtue of the sex of the parents.203 Moreover, these
lesbian and gay families, like other adoptive families and families
created through ART, do not have complete biological connections with
the children. There remain people outside of the legal family who have
reciprocal biological, and sometimes affective, relationships with the
children. Birth fathers, birth mothers, and gamete donors are often
known in these adoptions and, like their heterosexual counterparts,
lesbians and gays may have ongoing relationships with the known donors
or surrogates.204
It is not clear whether these relationships in the adoption context are
as rich or enduring as the studies suggest they are in the ART cases.
197. Id.
198. The county would not allow him to become a pre-adoptive foster parent as long as he
lived with an intimate partner who would not participate in the foster care licensing process. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 36–37.
201. He reported his mother telling him that ―there‘s nothing to accept. You‘re natural, you‘re
normal.‖ Id. at 38.
202. Id.
203. See discussion and notes supra Sec. II.2.
204. E.g., Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
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There may be something about the legal and psychic aspects of the
adoption process that discourages these relationships,205 or it simply may
be that the case law and studies do not yet reflect these practices. At any
rate, there is some evidence that open adoptions are occurring among
lesbian and gay parents. For example, a gay couple who adopted a child
in Washington agreed ―[a]s part of the adoption proceedings‖ to ―bring
[the child] back to Oklahoma to visit her birth family.‖ 206 In another
reported case, a white male gay couple who adopted an African
American infant had an agreement with the birth mother, who lived with
them while pregnant, for ongoing visitation after adoption.207
Mostly though, the reported decisions permitting same-sex couple
adoption reflect traditional adoptive family relationships, primarily
lesbian second parents seeking to adopt their partners‘ biological
children.208 These cases do not reveal any suggestion that the adoptive
families had ongoing contact with the donors or birth parents. Because
the female reproductive roles (gestation and egg donation) are more
intense and intrusive than that of the men (sperm donation) gay male coparents are at more of a disadvantage in obtaining children for adoption.
Thus, gay men may be more likely to have relationships to birth mothers
because gay men have less access to children and are more likely to
negotiate with birth mothers for ongoing contact after adoption.209
IV. LESSONS OF ADOPTION WITH CONTACT
The expansive kinship networks of so many same-sex couple
families suggest that it is not necessary to undermine or devalue biology
as a primary basis of family to achieve protection or recognition for other

205. It may be that the very formality and publicness of the processes of terminating parental
rights and creating new parents may require adoptive parents to project normalcy rather than messy,
rambling extended families, in order to gain the sanction of social services and courts.
206. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2006) affirmed in part,
reversed in part, Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007). This language suggests that
the agreement may have been made pursuant to Washington‘s adoption with contact statute, WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.33.295 (1990).
207. In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995).
208. E.g., In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d
1088 (Me. 2007); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397
(N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B, 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
209. See Tasker, supra note 112, at 225 (―Many gay men have become fathers through coparenting arrangements with lesbian mothers‖ with or without sperm donation, through surrogacy
arrangements, and adoption of foster children.). However, in most of the few reported gay male
same-sex couple adoption cases there was no indication that there was any post-adoption contact. In
re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002).
Of course, post-adoption contact was not an issue in those cases, so if there was any such contact, it
would not necessarily have been reflected in the proceedings.
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family formations, including adoptive families, kinship networks, and
same-sex or plural parent families. Nor is it necessary to discard these
new family forms in favor of modern values. More helpful may be an
enhanced notion of biological connection—one that accounts not only
for the social and political importance of biological connection, but also
for the existential aspects of biological ties and the palpability of genetic
tissue for the adults and the children. The persistence of the profound
existential and social importance of biological connections suggests we
are not ready to define families through the relationship between the
adults and disregard the child‘s connections to biological parents and
gamete donors. This does not mean that legal parents should be
recognized solely by biological relationship to the child or that children
should have multiple parents with full parental status.
On the other hand, some rules may be helpful. Many of these
blended lesbian and gay families live outside the law. As these
relationships become more common, and lesbians and gays more visible,
it is likely that disputes will arise regarding these satellite relationships.
Already there are several reported decisions. 210 One case involving a
bicoastal extended family started out as many same-sex parent families
do—with a lesbian couple utilizing known donors to conceive their
children.211 Robin and her partner Sandra lived together with their two
children, one born to Sandra who conceived through known donor
insemination and the other born two years later to Robin also through
known donor insemination.212 Robin‘s donor orally agreed that he would
not seek to establish parental rights to the child. 213 The mothers coparented both children and gave them each both of their last names.214
The fathers did not have much involvement in the early years of the
children‘s lives, but when the oldest child was five and started asking
about her father, the mothers arranged for the children to have more
interaction with the fathers. 215 During the next six years, Robin‘s
daughter Ry had significant contact with her father, Thomas, seeing him
for a few days to two weeks at a stretch approximately twenty-six times;
during that period, they appeared to develop a ―warm and amicable
relationship‖ and exchanged correspondence in which Ry expressed her
210. LaChapelle v. Minton, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Thomas S. v. Robin Y.,
618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994); see also Cahn, supra note 77, at 1162 (―Repeatedly, sperm
donors have received extensive visitation rights over the objection of the biological mother and her
partner.‖)
211. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
212. Id. at 357.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 358.
215. Id.
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love for her father. 216 This amicable situation deteriorated after Robin
and Sandra refused to allow Thomas to take Ry, then about nine-yearsold, and her older sister Cade to visit with his parents without their
mothers. 217 It was at this point that Thomas indicated he wanted to
establish parental rights, a revelation that upset the delicate balance the
family had established.218 When negotiations regarding the father‘s role
and relationship to Ry languished, Thomas sought a court order for
filiation and visitation.219
So began a four-year legal battle during which the trial court
dismissed the action on equitable estoppel grounds, refusing to grant
legal parental status to Thomas; then the appellate court reversed on due
process grounds. 220 Although the appellate court did not contemplate
removing Ry to her father from her mothers,221 the dispute had an all-ornothing character to it. Either Thomas was the father and could press for
increasing visitation or custody222 or he was not and had no right to any
relationship with the child. Neither option seems quite right because the
primary family unit was the nuclear family of Robin and Sandra and their
two daughters. It is one thing to have a dispute about the extent of
visitation; it is quite another to have a third person, albeit a biological
father, with full, legal parental status in what began as an exclusive, if
not legally enforceable, parenting relationship among Sandra, Robin and
their two daughters. 223 This exclusivity becomes even more poignant
because, should something happen to one of the mothers, the other legal
parent (here the father) would have a legal claim to the child while the
social mother would not. Moreover, this four-year dispute must have
taken an emotional and financial toll on all of the parties, not least of all
the children.
A similar, but messier, more complex, and longer dispute arose
involving a lesbian couple and a gay male couple. 224 In that case, a
lesbian couple agreed in writing that one of the women, Mitten, would

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 358–62.
221. Id. at 358–59 (―Custody of the child is not now, and is unlikely ever to be, an issue
between the parties. Rather the question is whether the rights of a biological parent are to be
terminated.‖).
222. This is despite the appellate court‘s assertion that custody would not be an issue; once
Thomas had parental status, he would have standing to seek and possibly attain custody, particularly
against Sandra should anything happen to Robin.
223. Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 358–59.
224. LaChapelle v. Minton, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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have a child conceived with the sperm of LaChapelle.225 The four signed
two agreements that defined the family such that Mitten and her partner
Ohanian would have full custody of the child and LaChapelle would
have no parental rights but he and his partner would have a ―‗significant
relationship‘ with the child.‖226 The child, L.M.K.O., was born the year
after they signed the second agreement; subsequently, the mothers
obtained second parent adoption, without disclosing they had used a
known donor. 227 Then, when L.M.K.O. was nineteen months old, her
mothers terminated visitation with her father and his partner. 228 In
response, LaChapelle successfully moved to vacate the adoption and
subsequently petitioned to establish paternity. 229 Mitten and Ohanian
then broke up and custody between them became an issue. Ultimately,
the court awarded joint custody to Mitten and Ohanian, adjudicated
LaChapelle to be the father, and ordered him to pay child support.230 The
litigation regarding this dispute lasted six years and, no doubt, carried a
huge emotional and financial price tag that most likely inured also to the
detriment of the child.
These cases reveal several problems that arise when family law does
not match the lived lives of families. Families are, of course, fertile
ground for disputes, but clarity regarding legal rights and responsibilities
accompanied by some deviation from all-or-nothing parental status could
help reduce these disputes and promote more stability for the children
involved. Adoption with contact is a model of community or shared
parenting that may have lessons for these same-sex parent families.231 It
undermines the heteronormative model of two-parent, exclusive
parenting by recognizing the multiple people who have parental or
parent-like relationships with children. At the same time, adoption with
contact preserves parental status and its authority, subject to any
voluntary agreements to allow contact or visitation with others. This type
of adoption may provide a model for same-sex couples seeking to
maintain a relationship with gamete donors.

225. Id. at 157.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 157–58. LaChapelle withdrew his request for legal custody on the first day of trial.
Id. at 160.
231. Of course, there are many other proposals for recognizing and regulating post-modern
families. E.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive Technology, 2004 U.
CHI. LEGAL FORUM 393; Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social
Paternity, 38 ARIZ. L.J. 810 (2006); Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL‘Y 47 (2007).
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In the dispute between Thomas and Robin, a written, enforceable
agreement regarding visitation and Thomas‘s legal status might have
narrowed the areas of dispute and perhaps prevented the dispute from
ever reaching the courts. For example, had the law permitted Thomas to
relinquish his parental rights and enter into a separate enforceable
agreement for visitation with Ry, he would have had the right to enforce
or perhaps modify that visitation agreement, but would not have litigated
the other issues regarding paternity. Similarly in the Mitten and
LaChapelle case, had Minnesota‘s adoption with contact statute been
enacted at the time of the second parent adoption, 232 they could have
simultaneously terminated LaChapelle‘s parental rights, established
Ohanian as the second legal parent, and entered into a legally enforceable
agreement that would have established the terms of the agreement and
provided standards for enforcement or modification.233 The child would
have two legal parents, Mitten and Ohanian, who were also her social
parents; LaChapelle‘s status would not have been litigated; and it would
have been clear that he was not entitled to consideration for custody. The
only issue for dispute would have been the terms of visitation, a dispute
that probably would not have lasted six years.234
While lesbians and gays seek legal regulation of and benefits for
their adult relationships through marriage or civil unions, they might also
look to establishing rules for the relationships they create and maintain
with biological parents outside the nuclear family dyad. Open adoption,
but more specifically, adoption with contact, shows that it is possible to
have bundles of rights, statuses, and connections that honor the parentchild and other biological and social relationships. Adoption with contact
232. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.58 (West 1997).
233. Regarding enforcement and modification, the Minnesota statute provides:
An agreed order entered under this section may be enforced by filing a
petition or motion with the family court that includes a certified copy of the
order granting the communication, contact, or visitation, but only if the
petition or motion is accompanied by an affidavit that the parties have
mediated or attempted to mediate any dispute under the agreement or that the
parties agree to a proposed modification. The prevailing party may be
awarded reasonable attorney‘s fees and costs. The court shall not modify an
agreed order under this section unless it finds that the modification is
necessary to serve the best interests of the minor adoptee, and: (1) the
modification is agreed to by the parties to the agreement; or (2) exceptional
circumstances have arisen since the agreed order was entered that justify
modification of the order.
MINN. STAT. ANN.. § 259.58(3)(c) (West 1997).
234. On the other hand, Mitten would not have been entitled to child support from LaChapelle,
but one wonders whether that is a fair exchange for the years of litigation and the corresponding
financial and emotional costs.
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also protects the authority of the primary legal parents who attain and
retain the authority to make important parental decisions regarding their
children, such as where the child will go to school, where the child will
live, with whom the child will visit, and all of the daily mundane and
not-so-mundane parental determinations. Even decisions regarding
contact with the birth family are, under adoption with contact,
voluntary—or at least they begin that way. Rejecting the myth of
separation may help enlarge the parental figures to whom children
relate—while still respecting some measure of family autonomy—and
bridge the gap between exclusive parenting and the accelerating growth
of non-traditional family systems..
The endurance of biological ties in society, if not in law, suggests
that we are not so post-modern that we are ready to release these
connections. There is, however, what appears to be an inexorable
movement away from the older, modern values and practices of nuclear,
heterosexual, patriarchal families as single parents, same-sex parents,
stepparents, kin and adoptive parents are raising children.235 Adoption is
a legal institution that, though not without warts and missteps, bridges
the modern and postmodern, creating legal stability for non-biological
parental relationships and increasingly accommodating both biological
ties and new family forms. Adoption‘s experiment with the complete
subversion of biological connection is coming to an end as adoptive and
birth families see and accept their interconnectedness. The practice of
open adoption has moved nearly half of the states to add to their lexicon
a form of adoption that recognizes the importance of family autonomy
while acknowledging the endurance of biological connections. This
adoption with contact is based on the knowledge that children‘s social
and biological ties are important to the child and to the adults who love
and are connected to the child, but that not all of these adults will have
the same relationship to the child.
The lessons adoption can share for other post-modern families—
those characterized by the absence of at least one biological parent—are
significant. Indeed, as lesbians and gays form families that are not fully
biological, they are already learning similar lessons as those learned in
traditional adoption. Adoption with contact provides a method for
regulating biological and non-biological relationships that privileges the
modern family form while acknowledging and protecting those
relationships that do not fit that narrow construct. This may be a model
235. ―More children are growing up in single-parent households and in a range of blendedfamily types—that is, those that include only one of the child‘s biological parents (usually the
mother) and an adult (usually male) biologically unrelated to the child.‖ Amy L. Wax, Engines of
Inequality: Class, Race, and Family Structure, 41 FAM. L.Q. 567, 576 (2007).
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of regulation for other post-modern families that seek still to have
parental autonomy but want structure and predictability for relationships
that are important to the child, but do not rise to full domestic status.
Just as adoptive families are increasingly facing each other and seeking
relationships that are balanced and respectful of the needs, rights, and
roles of family members, lesbian and gay families comprise a rich and
varied array of legal and extralegal relationships among birth relatives,
legal parents, domestic partners, and the adoptee.

